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What should our ethical concerns be in a future with ‘Artificially Intelligent’ agents? 
The zeitgeist of AI agents often envisions a future encompassing a hyper intelligent singularity.  In this 
worldview, AI “monsters” appear very separate from us as, abstracted, ethically ungrounded omnipotent 
overlords. A world of superintelligences that have moved beyond our comprehension, with no ethical 
restraint.  
In this polemic, I explore a different future.  I discount the ‘Robopocalypse’ initially depicted in Science 
Fiction. Instead, I examine how realistic digital humans do pose a very real and different ethical 
dilemma, as we assume intelligence based on their appearance, leading to an abdication of 
responsibility.  
I phenomenologically explore the future of realistic digital agents and avatars, and ask: what does this 
human-like form say about us? How will we judge ourselves when the computer, looks like us? I argue 
that the singularity is unlikely and thus the primary ethical concern is not some superhuman AI 
intelligence, but in how we, ourselves, treat these digital humans. 
  
Keywords : Embodied cognition, Virtual humans, Avatars and Digital Agents, Existentialism. 
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1 Introduction  
Who are the AI actors we see in a digital future? The spirit of our age in popular culture would suggest 
that many people are horrified by the notion of realistic digital people, be they robots or computer 
simulations. The media landscape is littered with intelligent robots gone wrong, computers taking over 
and the notion of an eventual robopocalypse. In this narrative, our digital overloads rise up and replace 
our emotionally imperfect humanity with a cold, rigid, and uncaring machine logic. Is this view of the 
world probable, or are we more likely to see a different digital actor, one that is more a reflection of 
ourselves? What, or who, will we actually be concerned with in the future? Are we troubled by a future 
vision of realistic digital humans? Are they uncaring, unethical monsters or should we be more 
concerned with how we will treat and react to these digital humans?  
I will show that while computers may appear as human, they will not have super intelligence in the 
foreseeable future. The threat they pose is not from ruling us unmercifully. The risk is in how we treat 
them; what that says about us and how easily we may be willing to empower them beyond their actual 
capabilities.  A human lack of understanding or ‘stupidity’ may be of far more concern than unethical 
robo-rule and annihilation.  
There exists in the zeitgeist the notion that scientists are driven, single minded idealists. In popular 
culture this is articulated in the film Jurassic Park, when the character Ian Malcolm states, "your 
scientists were so preoccupied with whether or not they could, they didn’t stop to think if they should". 
This builds on the popular notion that researchers work without thinking in advance about moral or 
other consequences. Or if scientists do ask ethical questions, they continue anyway, resigned to the 
inevitability that science cannot be stopped, and someone will always take the next step. This 
'precautionary principle' of lack of informed prudence, dates back to Mary Shelley's Frankenstein and 
is seen today in TV series such as Westworld.  There is some evidence that this Hollywood image may 
not be without some basis in truth1. Under this view, the world will be inhabited by technologically 
enabled monsters, these monsters threaten our liberty, control our destiny and our very existence. This 
narrative would have these AI monsters as the natural and inevitable product of continued computer 
advances towards computer based consciousness. I do not dispute the advances of technology, just the 
nature of virtual human agents and actors that are likely to be in our world. 
Against this backdrop I explore the phenomenology of the next generation of synthetic, digital actors. 
Phenomenology comes from the Greek word "to appear", and based on the work of Husseri, Hegel, 
Heidegger and the French Existentialists such as Merleau-Ponty.  
Ethics are at the core of our belief system and govern behaviour. Ethics therefore sit at the nexus of the 
concepts I am exploring, digital humans, being human/having consciousness and virtuous behaviour.  
The work of the 18th century Immanuel Kant is relevant today in this modern setting. While Kant’s view, 
equating humanity with consciousness is at odds with later philosophers, his work on ethics is relevant. 
Kantian Deontological ethics such as the Categorial Imperative, are a key part of commonly held views 
on ethics today. While Kantian views of philosophy are moderated or questioned by later philosophers 
(Riemer & Johnston, 2017), his ethical perspectives remain a useful normative or prescriptive tool.  It is 
with this lens that we explore a future inhabited with digital humans. 
I question ethical and societal implications of realistic virtual humans, whereby digital agents and 
avatars will stand in for us, represent us and reflect us.  
I start by dispelling the myth that a super intelligent singularity is likely. To do this, I rely on the work 
of philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty. They disputed the Cartesian view that the mind and the 
brain/body can be considered anything other than one non-decomposable whole.  
I then point to the natural and likely development of realistic cognitive agents. I argue that these agents 
will succeed not because they are logical, emotionless automatons. They will gain acceptance for exactly 
the opposite reason. Their affective emotional base (or rather, simulation thereof) will be what drives 
their acceptance and use. Rather than emotions being viewed as a flaw, the emotional engagement of 
such agents, combined with realistic human-like appearances, will drive wide scale adoption. 
In taking this view, rather than evoking futures of bipedal gun-laden cyborg machines lumbering 
emotionlessly towards us, I offer an alternative. A better analogy is a 'future mirror' that reflects us, 
embracing emotional engagement with extensions of our humanity that encompasses artificial agents 
and digital avatars. These “digital humans” are simulations that not only accurately reflect our 
                                                        
1 Cognitive scientist, and pioneer of AI, Marvin Minsky at MIT stated to his students, "ethicists are people who give reasons to not do a thing" 
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appearance, but also indirectly our humanity. They are not capable of actual emotion, but they more 
than adequately simulate emotion effectively.  
I will show that our future will not have independent AI thinking monsters. While there is a popular 
move to extrapolate from significant gains in Machine Learning (ML)and especially computer vision to 
actual intelligence, current ML does not indicate a path to general intelligence. Collins argues that the 
public perception has exceeded reality and that the non-(social)embedded nature of computers means 
they lack social learning.  He outlines how computers are far from being able to actually understand 
(Collins, 2018).  
We will not have general super human intelligence in a computer agent in the foreseeable future. The 
science fiction narrative would have computers learning from computers in a closed loop. The most 
effective actual approach of this concept of AI learning from another AI engine has Generative 
Adversarial Networks (GAN) (Goodfellow et al., 2014). While leading researchers such as Deep Learning 
pioneer and Facebook AI director Yann LeCun have called innovations GANs “This, and the variations 
that are now being proposed is the most interesting idea in the last 10 years in ML” (Mayo, 2016), it is 
not a path to general intelligence. LeCun is one of the co-creators of convolutional neural networks 
(CNN) and yet LeCun believes society is far from any form of general intelligence. “We’re very far from 
building truly intelligent machines. All you’re seeing now — all these feats of AI like self-driving cars, 
interpreting medical images, beating the world champion at Go and so on — these are very narrow 
intelligences, and they’re really trained for a particular purpose” (Vincent, 2017). 
There can be no general human intelligence without some notion of consciousness. Since early last 
century, philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty & Landes, 2013), have argued that one 
can not have human cognition without embodiment. No humanness can exist separately, or isolated. 
Against this notion, we will have computer agents that are rendered to look real and that we will co-
create such that we treat them as if they are their own embodied cognitive entities. While they will not 
have intelligence in any true sense, it might not matter. How we interact with them will reflect who we 
are. They will reflect us and what we bring to the experience. I suggest that many people will not stop 
short of imbuing them with far more intelligence, far more depth than they have. This ability to believe 
from the strong illusionary clues that the agent is ‘smart’ will only be emphasised by a general sense in 
modern society of technology being constantly innovative and wonderous.  A sense that ‘they can do 
anything’ will feed an irrational belief in some that the realistic agents are, in fact, exhibiting genuine 
general intelligence. For others the cloak of intelligent human simulation will allow a greater trust in the 
agent’s judgement than might be rationally attributed.  
The central ethical question is not how we instil ethics in machines, but what our interactions say 
ethically about their use. In this context I argue that realistic agents reflect each of us ethically. This re-
orientation is critical to how we present agents, legislate and discuss safeguards. Our current orientation 
is to waste our efforts on protecting ourselves from a future AI monster that is improbable, while 
neglecting other real ethical issues. 
2 BACKGROUND 
I start by defining what I mean by digital human agents, or avatars. An agent is a fully computer-based 
entity that exhibits, at least to some degree, autonomous behaviour (Seymour, Riemer, & Kay, 2018). 
Agents can carry out specified, recurring tasks in a self-directed way, or interact with human actors in 
various ways, including natural language understanding and/or dialogue. For example, Conversational 
agents are based on machine-learning and natural-language processing, generation technology, and 
they interact with human users “in natural language while being sensitive to their cognitive and 
emotional states” (Graesser, Li, & Forsyth, 2014). Examples of current conversational agents are 
personal digital assistants, such as Amazon’s Alexa, Apple’s Siri or for example Google's Duplex 
Assistant (Leviathan & Matias, 2018). Moreover, conversational agents that are visualized and “combine 
speech with non-verbal modalities for intelligible multimodal utterances” (Kopp & Wachsmuth, 2004) 
are commonly referred to as embodied conversational agents (ECA) (Cassell, 2000).  
Avatars refer to visual representations of human actors. An avatar can be thought of as a digital puppet, 
a character that is instructed by and acts on behalf of a human actor for whom the avatar acts as a digital 
'stand-in'. For the purposes of this paper I will assume it is an interactive avatar and not a pre-rendered 
depiction of a human, for example a digital actress or actor in a motion picture. 
2.1 Advances are not an inevitable path to computer intelligence 
If our fear is AI monsters with super-intelligence running amok, how possible or likely is that future?  
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I assume the advances in computer graphics will be able to solve the appearance of digital human agents. 
Already digital characters are closely resembling the visuals of their real human counterparts. In facial 
visual simulation, the progress of graphics technology shows no signs of slowing. In this respect, the 
power of computer graphics to render a human far outstrips our ability to simulate the responses and 
intelligence of a human.  
Away from science fiction, the greatest risk of super-intelligent monsters is from the hype surrounding 
the discussion, not the reality. Much is written about computers taking all our jobs as they become 
'intelligent' (PwC, 2017). While job losses and reallocation of jobs is a real issue, the extent of computers 
becoming super-intelligent is often vastly over played. Our future will not be defined by human like 
intelligence in a computer, and thus we should not be focused on the ethical concerns of computers 
becoming so powerful that they replace most of our jobs and render us irrelevant.  
I will now show why it is flawed to assume one can build human intelligence, or download a mind, from 
the perspective of Technical and Conceptual points of view. Finally, I will look at the special case of 
avatars. Human Avatars introduce a new ethical problem centred around identity 
2.1.1 Technically: We are not a computer 
I start by questioning the base assumption that it is possible, with any extrapolation of known 
technology, to produce a separate digital human intelligence or download a human intelligence into a 
computer.  I challenge the view of many leading AI experts including Ray Kurzweil, Google’s Director of 
Engineering. 
Kurzweil stated in 2017, that by 2029, computers will have human-level intelligence. He added that by 
2045 we will have a ‘Singularity', and that this superintelligence will abruptly trigger runaway 
technological growth, resulting in unfathomable changes to human civilization.  
The silicon utopian vision of a general application deep AI (as opposed to the limited pattern-matching 
software that the term often refers to currently) is based on the extrapolation of the past exponential 
growth of computer power. This growth extrapolation is core to the belief that anything is possible. 
Authors have stated it will lead to "the extermination of the human species by godlike artificial 
intelligences" (Anonymous, 2018). Kurzweil's view of the same inflection point is that it will provide vast 
extended computer enhancement with brain implanted humans directly connected to a vast hive mind 
of knowledge. I will now explain how this is based on a false assumption. The problem is a not numerical 
one. It is wrong to assume that human intelligence is a computationally bound problem. 
Our ability to explain our being, has always been influenced by the technical language of the day. In the 
industrial revolution, this meant we saw a person as a machine, who 'worked up a head of steam' and 
who's muscles were like pistons. Today, this metaphoric language is replaced with computer terms. It is 
not uncommon to hear of someone needing to stop 'networking' and 'download' the events of the day. A 
mild loss of one's 'train of thought' is now a 'glitch' or an 'overload'. The mind and physical brain can be 
referred to as the “software and hardware” of humanity. The senses are “inputs” and behaviours are 
“outputs”. Children are taught in schools that neurons are “processing units” and synapses as “circuitry” 
to life. The very nature of cellular replication plays into this concept, with our own molecular DNA as a 
double helix biological software script for life. This language implies we are similar in our thinking to 
computers, are we are not. 
The problem with the 'we are like a computer' lens of humanity is that it colours our view of what could 
be. In this worldview, the mind could be downloaded to a computer, should the computer be powerful 
enough. It is argued that we just need to match the capacity of a human brain when measured in 
petaflops of neurons or terabytes of memory. But this ignores the reality of how vastly unlike a computer 
the human experience is. Our memories are not stored in a file, sequentially in a human cerebral 
database (Greenfield, 2016). There is no direct equivalency of human thought and memory with CPUs, 
GPUs or RAM. Consciousness itself is poorly understood and there is no clear computer equivalent, or 
even a roadmap to attempt to research broad human level consciousness away from science fiction 
(Greenfield, 2016).  
Kurzweil explained that current computational growth trends will soon lead to "computers having 
human intelligence". Leaving aside the timeline, to agree or disagree, we need to explore the nature of 
human intelligence (Reed & Galeon, 2017). I have disputed this technology extrapolation and now I 
challenge how different human intelligence and consciousness is from computers conceptually. 
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2.1.2 Conceptually:  We are more than our minds 
To match human intelligence in an agent, we would need to address consciousness. This is not a 
computational problem that will be solved as Moore's Law continues playing out over time. There is no 
level of computer power where we have any indication that a computer would magically have 
consciousness. It is not a processing or memory limit bound problem. It is a different kind of problem, 
and finding a solution is not a natural consequence of just increased computational power.  
Human intelligence linked completely to human consciousness. This is not just a high enough level of 
intelligence, it is something different. The mind is not the same as consciousness.  I can easily change  
my mind while conscious. I do not ‘lose my mind’ when asleep, or if I am rendered unconscious or I am 
under anaesthesia. Consciousness is 'me-ness', it is part of me, not just intelligence stored in a container.  
Science has yet to solve the nature of human consciousness. We must do this before we can match it. I 
acknowledge that this has been recognized in research and philosophy previously.  
A great contribution to the alternative non-Cartesian perspective is found in the writings from early last 
century of authors such as Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty & Landes, 2013). His work, The 
Phenomenology of Perception, written many decades ago, can provide an alternative view. Here we find 
justification for accepting just how improbable and unlikely a future is that suggests building human 
intelligence in a machine or downloading of consciousness into a computer.  At the heart of Merleau-
Ponty's The Phenomenology of Perception (Diprose & Reynolds, 2011; Merleau-Ponty & Landes, 2013) 
is the assertion that the body is an inseparable part. As opposed to the views of Descartes and a common 
contemporary view that the body is just a container for consciousness," Merleau-Ponty's view is that one 
is one's body, "I am my body". A body with "momentum of existence", that exceeds any biometrically 
objectified body. This body is understood to be the locus of "being-in-the-world", être au monde, which 
is a direct adaption of Heidegger's in-der-Welt-sein. He believed that the body is our general medium 
for experiencing the world. This negates the notion that there can be a true and full 'Embodied Cognition' 
for an agent, as there is no body. At best, we can just emulate it. 
I believe the phenomenology of virtual human identity can be built on the foundations of Merleau-Ponty, 
regardless of his writings preceding modern computers (Matthews, 2010). Here we are best thought of 
as just one non-decomposable whole. For Merleau-Ponty the body is not merely occurring in a space or 
a time, but "inhabits ('habite') space and time". I do not live based on a representational conceptual map 
of the world in a traditional, old school AI sense; I am in the world and interacting with it, and in so 
doing, not just making sense of it, but the very interactions define my conscious reality. 
We have no computation model for this existentialist consciousness in the world. It cannot be modelled 
or simulated. I might go so far as to say this is the existential crisis of the Singularitarians when 
predicting super-intelligence. Without actual general intelligence we have just the illusion of life, unless 
the digital human is driven by a real person, much like a puppet. 
2.1.3 Avatars: the illusion of life and the issue of identity with digital humans. 
It is easier to simulate appearance than reproduce intelligence. With various types of input and tracking, 
it is possible to drive a simulated human with natural movement and effectively puppet a digital human. 
Such puppet style manipulations can lead to deception. As computer graphics produce increasing 
realism, the ability to detect such forgery is becoming more difficult. The deception can take various 
forms 
1. Giving the illusion of life and artificial intelligence when the ‘intelligence’ is really human, 
2. Showing an inaccurate persona e.g. presenting as a child, when an adult, 
3. Presenting as someone other than yourself or impersonating another.  
 
The ethical issues are complex. There are examples in each of these three categories, that move beyond 
the core ethical deception of mis-representation: 
1. Presenting financial advice as if sourced from a mathematical analysis compared to a personal 
preference could greatly influence a potential investor. The illusion that the computer could 
provide an objective recommendation, free from personal opinion would influence the framing 
of that advice.  
2. Representing one’s self differently to how you really are. If someone had a facial scar from an 
accident, would it be ethical to use technology to present themselves without the scar, if this 
helped their self-confidence? Would it be appropriate to present one’s self without a major 
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disability? Does the benefit for the individual out weight the societal issue of hiding ‘perceived’ 
human imperfections and thus avoids normalizing disfigurements? 
3. The issue of impersonation creates two problems.  The harm of disinformation (and its 
evitable breakdown of trust) and the excuse that any embarrassing filmed action, or 
transgression could have been faked, and thus even authentic footage is discounted in its 
probative value. 
 
The discussion thus far has been regarding a digital human agent or avatar, but there is a particular case 
to be made for examining a physical presence, namely a robot.  I will now explore the robotic artificial 
human. 
3 Embodied Cognition:  Domo Arigato, Mr. Roboto 
We now turn to the issue of agents with a real-world presence as it applies to AI and robotics. This 
excludes industrial robots that one might find in a car factory, which are intended to lack independence 
and perform only repetitive prescriptive tasks.  
In robotics, success in practical terms has not come from advances in super isolated intelligence. Success 
has come from a simpler form of emulation. Yet the success of emulation and the appearance of 
intelligence, has created strong populist concerns of a robopocalypse. This appears to be an unfounded 
andromorphic extrapolation. The robots now appear more natural and thus they are assumed to be 
radically more intelligent.   
A form of embodied cognition has proven successful in dealing with complex real world technical issues 
such as mobility in robotics. Honda's ASIMO robot was built using an older traditional cognitive, 
computational approach, sometimes called Computational Theory of the Mind (CTM), which relies on 
a representational view of the world (Chemero, 2011). Honda was able to make the robot walk and climb, 
but even minor issues could disrupt the robot as it tried to interpret data, update its model of the world, 
and decide on a reactionary course of action. Compare this to the work of Boston Dynamics, which built 
a series of robots starting with BigDog using a very different approach(Thompson, 2012). The BigDog 
robot can handle complex terrain and later versions even managed to recover from violent knocks or 
walking on slippery ice. Boston Dynamics decided that a computational strategy would be too slow and 
so opted for a Dynamic System. They built a robot with springy legs and joints that mimic those seen in 
animal quadrupeds. BigDog has a comparatively small computer and its success was not due to it having 
access to a more powerful computer than ASIMO. "The specific movements he produces at any given 
time emerge from the interaction between his moving legs, the surface he's on and any other forces 
acting on him. If you knock BigDog, he doesn't need to re-compute his behavior; he simply responds to 
the new force and the details are left up to his anatomy"(Thompson, 2012). Dynamic Systems Theory 
(DST) is a broad approach imported from the physical sciences and used in cognitive science as an 
alternative to the computational and information-processing approach. DST is best described, according 
to Chemero as "complex, non-linear, self-organizing and emergent and whereby cognition develops 
over real-time as a probable description of many possible alternatives instead of linear-assembly-of-
symbolic-processes". It works by assuming real time embodiment and not a dualist CMT model.  
Beyond acknowledging the superior approach, the reaction to BigDog and its successors has been 
particularly informative. The DST solution produces a very natural looking physical solution to 
movement, especially if the robot is interfered with. This has resulted in the robots being described as 
"very biological" (Thompson, 2012). A wide scale reaction to videos of these tests can be characterized 
by the quote that the company makes "autonomous pack mules like BigDog that inspire fear with every 
step". This narrative directly plays into our monster view of the future. Testing of these robots recovering 
from humans pushing them, prompted comments of fear of retribution when the computers 'rise up'. 
Comments such as those made by the BBC, that some version of BigDog might be used in the future for 
"terrorizing humble civilians … - especially if we go around treating them as badly as this!" The fear 
appears to be connected to how natural and biological the robot's interactions are in the world. One can 
only speculate how dramatically people would react to this style of robot if they had realistic human 
faces. 
Our background affects our view in this context. Depending on your point of view, the BigDog is close 
to being a monster, or it is an extension of my affordance with regards mobility. Both are reflections of 
who we are. What BigDog is, reflects me. I co-create what it is.  My worldview for it as either a monster 
or an invaluable step towards Army troop mobility. BigDog has the illusion of 'life', which one can start 
to anthropomorphize as it is moves more realistically in the world. It is not profoundly more intelligent, 
but many people may believe it is, due to its natural simulation of movement. 
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This Robotic example highlights a bigger issue. The isolated success of a particular AI or Machine 
Learning application is often seen as indictive of a greater intelligence. But as Oxford Professor Floridi 
wrote, “the truth is that climbing on top of a tree is not a small step towards the Moon; it is the end of 
the journey” (Floridi, 2016). He goes on to point out that isolated advances will continue to be made and 
in their isolated areas, we are going to see increasingly smart machines able to perform more tasks that 
we currently perform ourselves. Such isolated success such as face recognition systems seems to the 
uninitiated, to represent great intelligence, but it is a narrow domain specific success and cannot be used 
to extrapolate other more general problem solving. The advances especially in deep learning, as a 
specialist subset of Machine Learning have provided great advances. It has especially done this in the 
area of digital humans. Facial reconstruction, tracking, emulation and rendering have all seen Machine 
Learning advances, but just as with BigDog, a more believable agent or avatar does not denote a vastly 
more naturally intelligent actor. 
 
3.1 The HCI development of realistic cognitive agents 
Until now I have not made the case that digital agents will come to naturally encompass biologically 
realistic appearances. I will now state that this is not only very probable, but desirable. I will explore 
how an agent with an expressive photorealistic face may change the nature of Human-Computer 
Interaction (HCI).   
A central part of research into digital humans has been to produce a photo-real digital double, or  
duplicate image. Given how important faces are to communication, the goal is a direct reflection of one's 
facial appearance that would be imperceptible from the human original.  
Far from being ‘user interface tools’ that recede into the background, these new human-looking tools 
will focus attention. Such agents will aim to communicate verbally and non-verbally, with emotionally 
laden facial expressions. They will seek the user's attention, engagement and trust. They will face us and 
look at us, literately.  
Such a future is reasonable to imagine as the four largest American corporations by market capitalization 
are all investing heavily in such cognitive assistant technology (Statista, 2015). Apple's Siri, Google's 
Assistant, Microsoft’s Cortana and Amazon's Alexa are all currently faceless, but it would seem 
reasonable that a joyous countenance on these AI bots is a logical next step. Not to be outdone, the sixth 
largest company, Facebook, has also embarked on an ambitious program of avatars that mimic us 
directly (Seymour, 2016).  
While some areas of the popular Press may voice anxiety and luddite resistance (Kletzer Lori, n.d.), 
research has also shown an overwhelming majority of white-collar workers are genuinely excited and 
optimistic about what technology can do for them. In an industry study, the majority of the 4,000-plus 
surveyed office workers believed AI technology will make them more productive and help them 
(Abramovich, 2017). This suggests there is momentum for strong potential adoption in organizations.  
Nicolas Negroponte postulated several decades ago, "in a foreign land, one uses every means possible 
to transmit intentions and read all the signals to derive even minimal levels of understanding. Think 
of a computer as being in such a foreign land... ours" (Negroponte, 1995). In this foreign land, the 
notion is that a computer should be made more aware of human means of communication, and the face 
is one of the most expressive mediums for nonverbal communication. "Interface is not just about the 
look and feel of a computer. It is about the creation of personality, the design of intelligence, and 
building machines that can recognize human expression". The challenge, he stated, was to make 
"computers that know you, learn about your needs, and understand verbal and nonverbal 
languages...."   Negroponte felt that the humans in the HCI equation were bearing the "burden of 
interaction". Computer power has grown steadily, and exponentially under Moore's Law. In the 
reasonable future, we could have both the innovation and available computer power to move the burden 
from "the shoulders of the human party" to the computer. 
The question we explore is not what is required to create a digital human, but what opportunities does 
that bring in relationships and what ethical questions about our humanity would such a development 
reveal? Affective computing explores two-way emotional communication as a new medium for HCI. But 
to paraphrase Negroponte, the medium is not the message. These new user interfaces are not about 
interfaces - it is about living with the new possibilities. 
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3.1.1 Appearances matter 
George Zarkadakis claims that a computer agent or avatar that behaves emotionally intelligent will be 
"considered intelligent even if it is a philosophical zombie (Zarkadakis, 2016)". People have 
anthropomorphized their 'dumb' devices without any engaging human appearance (Reeves & Nass, 
1998). With an expressive human face, the natural tendency will be to react to the computer agent with 
emotional sincerity. 
BabyX is an unscripted simulation of a child pioneered by Mark Sagar. BabyX is both a simulation of 
neurochemistry and the appearance of a real baby (Sagar, Seymour, & Henderson, 2016). The simulation 
is highly advanced and uses various forms of audio and visual input to emulate a child on the screen. It 
is one of the most advanced such attempts. 'She' is a very good simulation of a child's interactions, neuro-
chemical responses, and emotional emulation based on input from someone standing in front of her 
screen's input devices.  
Observing real interactions of people with a live BabyX demonstration, audience members anticipate 
and seek subtle and emotional responses from BabyX as the engagement happens. People imbue the 
agent with human traits based on their personal pre-learnt real-world interactions with infants.  
During these technical demonstrations (“DISRUPT.SYDNEY 2014 Short Talk 4 by Mark Sagar,” n.d.),, 
Sagar and his team have modelled the BabyX receiving a pain response from the tap of a key.  In multiple 
sessions audience members have urged the demonstrator to stop so as to not ‘hurt the baby’. 
This, after at least fifteen minutes of explanation by Sagar of the underlying simulation including 
visualizations of the faceless brain model of BabyX. There is no sense that the audience rationally thinks 
the baby is real, but they immediately emotionally react as if she is, as Sagar moves to press the P key 
for Pain. The session was part of an academic conference presentation, the pain response a valid part of 
a comprehensive brain model, yet the audience’s response was akin to Sagar actually hurting a real child.  
This emotional response is very real, and is often followed by laughter, interpreted as a stress release 
and an acknowledgement of the surprisingly immediate visceral reaction. Interestingly, Sagar, then 
naturally laughs, as laughter is infectious and then BabyX laughs as "Dad" (Sagar) is laughing. 
The implication of the observed behavior is that it demonstrates the agent, is part of the holistic 
environment and the co-defined dynamic interaction. What the simulation 'is', is co-defined by Sagar's 
research, along with the audience. The spontaneous emotional responses indicate that the audience's 
worldview very much co-defines the agent. This raises valid ethical questions about our perception of 
realistic agents, and the way simulated humanity will invoke deeply embedded responses.  
Human interaction remains mostly about building and sustaining social bonds. I find that our casual 
language implies something that is not accurate. Picard, in her work defining Affective Computing, 
points out that people are known to comment that, if we could be 'less emotional, more logical' we would 
function better in society, but the opposite is true (Picard, 2003).  Affective computing and computers 
emulating emotion is an important aspect to be explored for future digital human agents.  
In everyday life, rather than being a limiting factor, emotions moderate and facilitate our behavior. 
Someone 'being very emotional' can be stated as an assumed negative, but without emotional responses 
people would not be able to function in society. I can find no scientific proof that removing all our 
emotions would make us better people or even more effective in society, furthermore there is an inherent 
assumption that human biases and emotion are faults, but I would argue they are a rich part of our 
humanity. Future digital agents will be an emotional phenomenon. With virtual humans, this will appear 
as an emotionally aware extension of us and by extension, a reflection of us. They will not be cold and 
logical. The agents will appear to be emotionally engaging. Another real-world example illustrates this 
point. 
Encoding Agents with the appearance of emotion will not make the agent human, but it will increase 
emotional authenticity. It will do this in the same way Google's Duplex audio-only agents incorporated 
human speech 'disfluencies' such as “hmms and uhs" (Leviathan & Matias, 2018) to seem natural. In 
Google's tests, an agent called various restaurants to book a dinner. The agent does not understand what 
makes a meal enjoyable or anything about the nature of food, it just appears to be human and engages 
the staff of the restaurant to talk to with it in the same way they would a normal human.  
What is critical to our discussion is that I judge the rudeness or helpfulness of the restaurant phone staff 
independently of the fact they are talking to an agent. If the staff had been rude and dismissive of the 
Google agent's enquiry, I would judge them poorly, even knowing myself they were not offending 
anyone, (any person). I would also personally judge them poorly if I knew they were talking to a 
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conversational agent.  It would inform my opinion of them if they swore and insulted the agent. This 
may not be another person's reaction, but then as I have shown, what that agent is co-defined by is my 
worldview and the agent's interaction.  
It is important to go one step further and acknowledge that the illusion of humanity of the agent will 
affect my response to it. I may only feel this way as the voice appeared so human, at least in part due to 
its 'hmms and uh's'. 
4 Ethics of our Agents and Avatars 
4.1 Ethical choices  
While a computer agent may appear independent, how an agent acts reflects on us. The fact that the 
agent is not human does not change this. For example, I am under no illusion that my pet dog is not 
human, yet my behaviour towards my beloved Labrador reflects greatly upon my humanity. While 
legally and conceptually he is very different from a person, any cruelty to my animal will draw a visceral 
rejection from most people in society. 
The perceived interaction of an agent will be affected by choices in appearance. The choice of an agent's 
age, sex, and race can greatly affect perceptions. Would a sexist, demeaning attitude to an agent, that 
looks like a younger female of a minority group be considered vastly less of an indictment because the 
agent can be described as not 'a real person'?  Would such behaviour not greatly influence the views of 
fellow workers or employers? If I chose my mother as my assistant, would this not send a message about 
who I am? It would inform someone very differently than if I selected instead an archetypal English 
butler, or a provocatively dressed anime school girl?  What we choose to represent us, who we choose to 
‘serve’ us, reflects a lot about us as 'users'. 
As mentioned, with the advent of advanced digital makeup, the question arises about the desire or 
otherwise of hiding facial flaws when choosing an online realistic avatar. Does this advance the 
individual or reinforce stereotypes of perfection? Would this eventually resign the less than perfect 
amongst us to primarily remote communication.   Could this make people who are self-consciously 
different further isolated? 
This digital misrepresentation extends to full impersonation. Deep Fakes and other technology already 
allow believable face replacement. It cannot be long before this can be achieved in real-time to a level 
that is not identifiable by untrained observers.  
Similar facial recognition AI algorithms that can aid in understanding can be used to monitor. Ironically, 
in China, agents designed to read human traits from people’s faces are being used to monitor school 
children's attentiveness in class (Connor, 2018). The attentiveness monitoring of pupils by three 
cameras connected to a facial recognition engine achieves the opposite effect of de-humanising the 
students. The performativity of the monitoring means the children must increasingly come to act in 
mechanistic ways to comply with the way in which the machine reads and renders humans. This 
monitoring chips away at the children's very individuality. 
The agency one gives to an agent as we resign decisions and cognitive functions to the agent also reflects 
on our character. If we defer even modest decisions to the wisdom of the AI agent, does this hybrid 
agency not characterize us and open us to the biases of the deep learning data sets of the AI Agent. In 
relinquishing our agency, we inherit the biases of the computer. Deep learning approaches solved inside 
their training space, the abdication of cognitive effort to an agent, is an abdication of one's own personal 
ethical sense of fairness and what constitutes unbiased reasoning. We are trading not just agency, but 
privacy with the corporate provider of the agent. The transaction is often predicated on selling some part 
of our privacy for the luxury of reduced cognitive load. Even one's willingness to trade personal liberty 
for ease of use, makes a strong statement. It reflects our values and our self-worth.  
5 Conclusion 
The ethical questions of AI and digital humans are not about a remote future Singularity that would 
grow to independently command our fate. Rather it is a question of the personal responsibility and level 
of control that one could have as these new digital opportunities provide a mirror to our personal values. 
I have argued that the important and relevant ethical issue facing our future with technology is not to 
attempt to build into sentient robots some Isaac Asimov style "Three Laws of Robotics" or some other 
kind of “safe word” or “safety switch”. I have shown in this polemic that the issue is rather our ethical 
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values reflected in our own interactions with and co-constituency of the digital agent. The robopocalypse 
is science fiction and not worth our serious consideration.  
It is important to turn the debate from futuristic scenarios that are highly improbable to a discussion of 
imminent implications of living with digital agents which are highly believable, expressive emotional 
parts of our lives, while also not attributing too much significance to their apparent intelligence. 
While the timeline is very much open to speculation, the resources and benefits of complex realistic 
digital agents is tangible. What these Agents will become is something I have shown to be co-defined by 
our interactions with them in the world. For us to examine the ethics of digital humans and simulations 
of cognition, we need to understand what it is that we are thinking about and how we think about the 
ethics of that situation.  
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